The recent announcement by Abdullah Ocalan calling for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and dissolve has generated cautious optimism about the prospects for peace between Kurds and the Turkish state after four decades of conflict. If successful, this renewed peace effort could be a game changer at a particularly delicate moment in the region’s history.

However, achieving peace is no simple task. The situation is complex, with multiple stakeholders inside and outside Turkey holding conflicting interests. Since Ocalan’s capture by Turkey in 1999, the PKK has evolved from a Turkey-focused insurgency into a broader pan-Kurdish movement with a presence in Syria, Iraq, and Iran under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK). As a result, any resolution between the PKK and Turkey will have significant consequences for Kurds and states across the region.

The Syria factor

Syria remains the primary point of contention between Turkey and the PKK. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controls nearly one-third of Syrian territory, is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG). The YPG’s political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), is another key component of the KCK. Turkey views the SDF as an extension of the PKK, a claim both the SDF and PKK deny—though SDF leaders have recently acknowledged some PKK presence in their areas and pledged to expel its elements. The extent of progress on this front remains unclear.

Ocalan’s February 27 call for disarmament left much room for interpretation, and Turkey appears to believe it applies to the SDF as well. 

His message urged “all factions to voluntarily convene their congresses” and declared that “all armed groups must lay down their weapons, and the PKK must dissolve itself.” 

The ambiguity in "all factions" and "all armed groups" raises the question: Was he referring to all KCK-affiliated forces? If so, why did he then explicitly call only for the PKK’s dissolution? The governing AK Party spokesperson Omer Celik has suggested that the statement includes the SDF. However, SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi refuted such interpretation, asserting that Ocalan’s call “is not related to us.”

Implications for Iraq

The PKK’s fate is also deeply tied to Iraq. Since Ocalan’s previous call for withdrawal in 2013, the group has consolidated its presence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where it had first moved some units in the late 1980s. 

Clashes between the PKK and Turkish military have destabilized the border areas for decades, with conflict intensifying in recent years—primarily playing out on the Kurdistan Region’s soil.

Iraqi Kurdish leaders have long sought to mediate between Turkey and the PKK, welcoming the current peace initiative in hopes that it will improve relations with Ankara and enhance stability at home. However, while the PKK’s presence has been a source of vulnerability for the Kurdistan Region, it has also given the Region some leverage in dealing with Turkey. A successful peace agreement may not be as straightforwardly beneficial to the Region as some assume, and its effects on Iraqi Kurdistan’s political dynamics remain to be seen. The PKK has an Iraqi affiliate, the Kurdistan Solution Democratic Party (PCDK), but it has been unable to win seats in Kurdish or Iraqi parliaments due to its lack of a popular base.

The Iran factor and the future of PJAK

Iran and its Kurdish population will also be affected by the outcome of Turkey’s talks with the PKK. While much focus has been placed on the SDF, little attention has been given to the KCK’s Iranian affiliate, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). PJAK is indeed the elephant in the room. 

PJAK’s activities target Iranian government forces, but the group is believed to have maintained an unannounced ceasefire with Tehran for several years as the PKK has improved its ties with Iran—particularly over the past decade.

A full PKK disbandment would be unwelcome news for Iran, especially at a time when Turkish influence is growing while Iran’s regional clout is waning after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. If the PKK ceases to exist, Iran would lose a potential ally to counterbalance Turkey both domestically and in Syria. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently expressed concerns that Iran may seek to support elements within the PKK to undermine Turkey’s position.

This raises critical questions about PJAK’s role. Is it being left out of the discussions so that the remaining PKK fighters can operate under its banner? If yes, would Turkey tolerate such an arrangement, or would it consider it a new security threat? Notably, PJAK—like the PKK—has been designated a terrorist organization by the US since 2009, whereas the SDF and PYD/YPG have not.

Looking ahead, PJAK’s future could be significant in the event of instability in Iran. If Iran were to face upheaval similar to Syria post-2011, could PJAK become a major force on the ground in Iranian Kurdistan? Would this align with Turkish strategic interests or create new challenges? Or would PJAK be useful to a weakened Iranian regime in such a scenario? If PJAK were to survive, the extent to which PJAK’s survival would aid or undermine Iranian Kurdish aspirations for political recognition remains an open question.

A fragile path forward

A lasting peace between the PKK and the Turkish government would have far-reaching effects on Kurds beyond Turkey’s borders. However, this process is fraught with uncertainty. 

Turkey might think it has the upper hand in this equation, believing it will achieve its goals whether through "peace" or continued conflict. It has sent mixed messages, leaving open the question of whether it genuinely seeks peace with the PKK or merely aims to defeat and dismantle the group as part of its “counterterrorism” strategy. However, as some in Ankara also tend to realize, with the regional geopolitical landscape undergoing profound changes—driven largely by Israeli initiatives—Turkey remains vulnerable, particularly in Syria, where Israel acts aggressively in pursuit of its strategic imperatives. Additionally, Ankara should anticipate some blowback from Iran, further complicating its position. This means Turkey's gains in Syria are far from secure. 

On the other side, the PKK is also in a strategic deadlock, with limited options. Failure would mean a repeat of the old cycle of protracted conflict, punctuated by short and often futile political negotiations. Achieving an outcome that benefits Kurds in Turkey and Syria will perhaps require both good fortune and creative thinking on the part of the PKK more than on Ankara.

Kurds across the region hope that a positive outcome and dignified resolution to the Kurdish question in Turkey, and Syria, will emerge from these negotiations. However, other regional actors—both within Turkey and beyond—may not share that hope and could actively work against it. If the peace process fails, even if due to Turkish inflexibility, the Erdogan government may use it as political justification to escalate military operations against the SDF in Syria and the PKK in Iraq, claiming it pursued peace, but the Kurdish side was not serious.

For now, the fate of the PKK, the future of Turkey’s policies on Kurds, and the broader regional ramifications remain uncertain. The coming months will be critical in determining whether this peace effort marks a true turning point—or just another chapter in the region’s long cycle of conflict.