ERBIL, Kurdistan Region — In the latest episode of The New Region’s Geospace podcast, host Mohammad A. Salih spoke with Dr. Shwan Jamal Aziz, an associate professor at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani, about the impact of recent political developments on the Kurdistan Region’s energy future.
Dr. Aziz’s research focuses on the political governance of natural resources and the role of oil and gas in state-building in both de facto and internationally recognized states, and he has taught at the University of Kent in the UK, the institution from which he received his PhD, the University of Warsaw, and several academic institutes across the Kurdistan Region.
Asked what the recent strikes on Sulaimani’s Khor Mor gas field signal about the future of Kurdistan’s energy sector, Aziz said the attack underlines “a serious security threat” to the Region’s gas industry and sends a clear warning about any major expansion plans.
He noted it is significant that gas installations, rather than oil fields, have become the primary targets.
“Whether non‑state groups or state‑backed proxies, the attackers are sending two main messages,” he said. “First, that any major expansion of the KRG’s [Kurdistan Regional Government] energy sector—whether to meet domestic demand or for export—will be met with immediate and focused violence. Second, that infrastructure itself is being used as a weapon for political purposes.”
The goal, he argued, is to limit the KRG’s energy autonomy and prevent it from emerging as an alternative regional gas supplier, particularly for Turkey and potentially Europe.
Aziz said Baghdad’s failure to hold perpetrators to account, despite KRG claims that rockets are launched from areas nominally under federal control, raises deeper questions about the federal government’s will and capacity to manage security.
High risk, high rewards for international companies
Years of legal disputes, inconsistent payments, halted exports, and militia attacks have reshaped how international oil and gas companies view Kurdistan, Aziz said.
“Kurdistan is now seen as a place with high rewards but also very high risk,” he explained. “These attacks make not only Kurdistan, but Iraq as a whole, look like a risky place for investment... They hurt both sides.”
The Kurdistan Region’s status as a de facto entity locked in disputes with the federal government has never been neutral for investors.
“By default, a de facto region that lacks international recognition will attract less foreign investment,” he said. “Most companies today are very cautious. They are not eager to expand their operations. Instead, they want to secure payment for what they have already done and protect their existing assets.”
“Some companies enjoy strong backing from their home governments or regional allies and can afford to remain,” he said. “Others are far more cautious and are in a wait‑and‑see mode before committing to new projects in the Kurdistan Region.”
Strategic asset or growing liability?
The value of Kurdistan’s oil and gas sector today is “mixed,” Aziz said, when looking at its role for the KRG, Baghdad, and the Kurdish public.
For the KRG, hydrocarbons were once the central tool of fiscal and political leverage. “Oil and gas used to be the main instrument to finance the government, pay salaries, and project economic independence from Baghdad,” he said.
This, however, has changed. Exports via Turkey have been periodically halted; Baghdad asserts control over revenues and approves export volumes; and international firms have begun to scale back or exit.
“For the KRG, the sector is still important—but it has also become a burden,” Aziz said. “It generates constant political dispute, legal uncertainty, and financial stress.”
“The Kurdish public has not seen the benefits they were promised,” Aziz noted. “Salaries are frequently delayed, unemployment is high, and corruption and lack of transparency have eroded trust. Many citizens now see oil and gas as a source of instability rather than prosperity.”
Can Kurdistan achieve self‑sufficiency?
Kurdistan’s subsurface potential is not in question, Aziz stressed. The Region holds sizeable oil and gas reserves, and earlier KRG plans envisioned producing one million barrels per day by 2015—an ambition that never materialized.
Technically, he argued, Kurdistan’s geology could support higher output. Politically and economically, however, the conditions are not there.
“Self‑sufficiency for the KRG is only conceivable when oil prices are high, pipelines are open, and contracts are independently managed,” he said. “Right now, none of those conditions fully exist.”
The next five years
Looking ahead, Aziz was cautious about forecasting the Kurdistan Region’s energy trajectory, stressing how quickly conditions can shift with changes in oil prices, security incidents, or regional politics.
“We are unlikely to see full recentralization,” he said. “But we will also not see genuine energy autonomy for the KRG. The likely scenario is something in between.”
“In the next five years, I see the KRG’s energy sector operating under managed cooperation, but with clear federal constraints,” he said. “Not full centralization, not real autonomy—something in the middle, shaped by politics as much as by markets or geology.”