Iraq is at a critical turning point, and for it to survive in the medium to long run it needs a major reset. Such a reset can only come from a rejuvenated Kurdish–Shiite alliance as the core political relationship ensuring the durability of the post-2003 order amid a tumultuous regional climate that threatens Iraq’s current political arrangement.

A rift has grown between the Shiites and the Kurds over the past decade or so. On the one hand, much of the Shiite political class has developed a sense of arrogance since 2017, believing they have finally “won” and consolidated control over the Iraqi state. Many see this dominance as historically justified, arguing that Shiites were unfairly deprived of power since the state’s founding, when the British installed a Sunni king from the Arabian Peninsula and relied on a Sunni officer class inherited from Ottoman times.

On the other hand, the core of Kurdish power—particularly the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—has grown increasingly alienated from Baghdad since the unsuccessful independence bid in 2017. Although the KDP’s rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), has sought to maintain closer ties with Shiite factions, this has not translated into a meaningful Kurdish role in decision-making in Baghdad. Divergent KDP–PUK strategies and objectives over the past decade have weakened the Kurdish position, leaving Kurds represented in Baghdad but without a genuine partnership in governance. While Kurds have held senior federal posts, including the presidency by PUK figures, they have proved largely ineffective in securing real Kurdish influence in Iraqi affairs post 2010. Undeniably, an internal Kurdish accord would be a prerequisite for bolstering Kurdish role in Baghdad.

The deterioration in Shiite-Kurdish relations is especially troubling given that the two sides together formed the backbone of Iraq’s pre-2003 opposition. Since the state’s creation in 1923, power had been dominated by Sunni Arabs, leaving Shiites and Kurds communities alienated from the state. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime in 2003 marked a historic rupture in that order, reversing fortunes and elevating Shiites and Kurds to the top of the political pyramid. However, it is important to realize that without Kurdish participation, the post-2003 Iraqi state could not have been built, nor could Shiite parties have governed alone with legitimacy, given extensive opposition from Sunnis and hostility from Iraq’s surrounding Sunni-majority neighbors.

Tensions began to surface in the late 2000s, particularly as then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki interpreted US backing for his government as a green light to centralize authority across Iraq, including over the autonomous Kurdistan Region and the Kurdish-majority disputed territories whose status is to be settled in accordance with Article 140 of the constitution. Since then, disputes over the scope of Kurdish autonomy, control of natural resources, and the steady marginalization of Kurds in Baghdad, and periodic attacks by Iran-backed Shiite armed factions have continued to poison relations. For their part, Shiite parties—especially after 2010—have increasingly viewed the Kurds, and the KDP in particular, with suspicion, accusing them of demanding “too much,” or of colluding with hostile domestic and external actors to undermine Shiite dominance. The list of grievances on both sides is long, some justified and others not.

Now the Middle East is in the grip of major transformation. Over the past decade and a half, Iraqi Shiites have come to view Iran as their principal regional backer and, in some respects, their protector, with Shiite-controlled parts of Iraq practically folded into the Iran-led regional axis. That axis is now severely weakened. The fall of the Assad regime next door—an outcome which Iraq’s Shiite-dominated state hoped to prevent for nearly fourteen years—has sent shockwaves through Baghdad. Meanwhile, US rhetoric toward Iran’s Iraqi Shiite proxies has reached an unprecedented pitch, with senior officials calling for their disarming and dismantling—an approach that, if advanced, could place Shiite dominance over the Iraqi state at serious risk.

At the same time, falling oil prices—down nearly $20 between early and late 2025—are likely to strain Iraq’s ability to sustain a public payroll approaching 10 million people. The resulting fiscal stress would further erode government legitimacy and could trigger broader state-society breakdowns. All things considered, any close observer of Iraqi politics can detect rising anxiety, even panic, among Shiite elites about the future of their rule and their community’s standing in Iraqi and regional politics. A peak moment of this unease came earlier this year, when calls for establishing an independent Shiite state surfaced in various Shiite circles.

Both Kurds and Shiites must recognize that internal instability—or the collapse of the existing order—would reshape Iraq’s political landscape in ways that run directly counter to their interests. There are regional actors who would welcome such an outcome and seek to reverse the post-2003 settlement altogether, pushing Iraq toward a pre-2003–like order. It would also be a mistake for anyone on the Kurdish side to think they would gain from the collapse of the current order.

A wide-ranging and genuine strategic agreement between key Kurdish and Shiite factions is therefore essential to safeguarding Iraq’s resilience and survival. This would require greater respect for the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy, including authority over energy management; the reversal of unjust judicial rulings against Kurdistan, particularly by the Federal Supreme Court; a fixed and uninterrupted share of the federal budget for the Region; and a negotiated framework for the joint administration of disputed territories—the latter addressing a long-standing point of contention and serving the interests of both sides. In practice, this would amount to confederalism, even if not labeled as such. Iraq’s constitution already gestures in this direction, conceiving the state as binational and bordering on confederal, without explicitly saying so.

In return, the Kurds should commit to the survival of the Iraqi state. The Peshmerga should be available for deployment in defense of the country against jihadi threats or other destabilizing forces. The 2017 independence bid demonstrated that neither the broader region nor the wider international community was ready for Kurdish statehood. A genuine partnership within Iraq would also allow Kurds to consolidate their position and that helps strengthen Iraq too. It would also allow Kurds to play a constructive role in softening the state’s rough edges—both regionally and in the eyes of the West—by counterbalancing destabilizing actors within Shiite ranks who are directed by Iran. Understandably, however, a stronger role for Kurds should not come at the expense of the internal stability of the Shiite house or their political influence in Iraq.

Some may interpret such a recalibration as marginalizing Sunni Arabs. It should not. Sunnis remain a central component of Iraq’s social and territorial fabric, and their alienation has repeatedly produced devastating consequences, as the period from 2003 to 2017 amply demonstrated. A renewed Kurdish-Shiite understanding must therefore ensure fair Sunni representation and respect for Sunni self-rule. State revenues should be redistributed on the basis of population size and conflict-related damage, and the presence of Shiite-dominated Popular Mobilization Forces in Sunni areas should be minimized to prevent renewed estrangement.

Nor should a renewed Shiite-Kurdish partnership be mistaken for an endorsement of the status quo. Rampant corruption and dysfunctional governance—especially in areas under federal control—remain existential threats. Durable stability will require serious reforms across economic, political, and security sectors. Time is running out for Iraq’s entire ruling class.

What I have argued for here is ultimately a win-win arrangement. No one should be naive about the difficulty of working out the details, but it can be done if there is sufficient political will. However, enduring stability for all Iraqis should be incentive enough. There are already signs of a desire for recalibration, including the recent respect shown by each community toward the right of other communities to nominate candidates for senior state positions following the November parliamentary elections. That goodwill should be seized and turned into momentum—toward a more resilient political contract that benefits Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis, and the Iraqi state as a whole.

The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the position of The New Region's editorial team.