Iraqi social media went abuzz early on June 28 with dramatic accounts of gunfire and arrests in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone, where many of the country’s political elites reside. The early reports were contradictory, with some describing the movement as a preemptive move against politicians allegedly planning a military coup. However, it soon became clear that the raids and arrests were part of a government anti-corruption campaign conducted with considerable fanfare. They came in the wake of the arrest of former Deputy Oil Minister Adnan al-Jumaili in late May on corruption charges and the ensuing media frenzy over his networks of enablers and beneficiaries.

By noon Baghdad time, as many as 21 politicians, lawmakers, and officials had reportedly been arrested, including senior Sunni politician Muthanna al-Samarrai and Shiite MP Alia Nassif. Iraqi state media initially reported 47 arrests, citing “high-ranking sources.”

Some accounts said this was only the first step in a process that could include dozens more, perhaps over 100 persons. Unverifiable dramatic footage of piles of cash, in Iraqi dinars and dollars, horse farms, and lavish homes appeared on social media accounts purportedly belonging to some of those arrested. This, unsurprisingly, generated outrage, especially as some scenes were attributed to politicians who had long projected an anti-corruption persona in public.

While the scale and scope of the arrests were unprecedented, the anti-corruption gesture itself is not new. At the beginning of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s term, the Federal Integrity Commission also launched arrests against individuals said to be involved in corruption. Later, the commission’s own head, Judge Haider Hanoun, was removed from his position, reportedly, on corruption and bribery charges. Sudani’s predecessor, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, also set up the now notorious Committee 29 to investigate corruption, but the committee was later revealed to have abused some of those it had detained. Yet Kadhimi’s term ended with what is popularly dubbed the “heist of the century,” in which, by some accounts, around $8 billion was stolen from Iraqi state banks through an elaborate scheme involving figures close to pro-Iran circles in Iraq.

Given this background, the key question on the mind of many in Iraq is what the motives are behind the current campaign, how far it will go, and who it will target. An effective anti-corruption campaign would require impartiality in both judicial and executive institutions. Otherwise, by selectively targeting certain individuals, the campaign will fail to remedy a structural and deep-rooted malaise. Selective targeting will undermine a move that might otherwise have broad popular support and make it appear more as an act of political score-settling or purge. Many have wondered why, among the prominent figures arrested so far, many appear to be Sunni or associated with Sudani. For instance, no Shiite or Kurdish politician of comparable status to Samarrai, who leads the 15-seat Azm Alliance, has been arrested so far.

Hence there is as much skepticism, if not more, as there is excitement, given past anti-corruption measures and the fact that current Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is not perceived to be powerful enough to take on the heavyweights in Iraq’s political class.

The context here matters as well. Zaidi’s moves come amid a deep economic crisis following the recent war between Iran, the United States, and Israel. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz since early March has made Iraq’s state revenues, around 90 percent of which come from oil sales, take a deep nosedive. Available estimates suggest Iraq had lost nearly $38 billion in oil export revenue by June 20, likely approaching $40 billion by the end of June.

This has reportedly forced the state to print money, borrow domestically, and tap reserves to pay civil servants, pensioners, and welfare recipients. Central Bank of Iraq data showed reserves falling from 131 trillion dinars in late January to 121.6 trillion dinars in May. That means around 9.4 trillion dinars, or roughly $7.2 billion, has been drawn down since January. Federal accounts through April showed a deficit of around $5 billion in the first four months alone, likely much higher by the end of June. For 2026 as a whole, Iraq's budget is expected to remain in deficit, exceeding last year's shortfall of nearly $13 billion. Against this backdrop, the images of piles of cash and confiscated properties were likely intended to communicate a sense of psychological relief to ordinary Iraqis—that the government was recovering their stolen money, replenishing the national treasury, and placing the country's finances on a stronger footing. But anyone familiar with Iraq's deep economic and fiscal realities knows that such seized wealth amounts to small change when measured against the country's much larger structural financial and economic problems.

This economic squeeze, and the pressure from Washington to push Iraq toward a more transparent and accountable economy while targeting corruption networks that feed off pro-Iran armed factions, provide the wider context within which the government measures, fully backed by the judiciary, have to be understood. Some media accounts claim the US government supported Zaidi’s anti-corruption measures by sharing information with Baghdad. The US angle is particularly important to note here, as Zaidi may well be timing these measures just weeks before his planned visit to Washington to signal his seriousness about tackling the corruption networks that have done so much damage to Iraq's credibility and reputation abroad. Given the rampant nature of corruption in Iraq, a serious anti-corruption crusade is guaranteed to generate public support and legitimacy—not just for Zaidi personally, especially since he has announced that he does not intend to run for a second term or form a political party, but also for a post-2003 order that has become widely despised domestically, for both right and wrong reasons.

Success on the basis of an impartial campaign reaching various corners of the state, even modestly, would be a major boost to Zaidi and could transform him into a statesman in the eyes of many Iraqis. It is hard to bet on this, but given US support for him, he might have a chance, even though Iran’s position in Iraq is arguably stronger after the war and expecting him to launch a broad, non-discriminating campaign might be expecting too much. He has, nevertheless, vowed to press ahead with the anti-corruption campaign. 

Ultimately, expectations of success need to be moderated. If in four years Zaidi can leave behind a government whose bureaucracy functions better, with fewer cases of petty corruption, less red tape, and higher state revenues through border crossings and taxation, he should be given a passing grade. In a fragmented political and communal landscape like Iraq, one highly susceptible to foreign pressure and influence, combating corruption is more likely than not to be a lengthy process, not a quick turnaround.