BAGHDAD, Iraq - Iraq has quietly begun taking its first practical steps toward restoring the state’s legitimate monopoly on the use of force, one of the country’s most consequential security transformations since 2003.

Yet despite tangible progress on several fronts, the broader political and institutional framework guiding the process remains incomplete, Iraqi officials, politicians, and commanders of armed factions involved in the process told The New Region.

With the issue expected to dominate talks between Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, US President Donald Trump, and senior US officials during the Iraqi leader’s visit to Washington this week, Baghdad is still trying to reconcile competing political and security approaches into a coherent national strategy.

While three armed factions have responded readily to Zaidi’s May integration call and reportedly handed over large portions of their weapons, others insist that any such move should only follow the complete withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, while a third group continues to reject the process altogether.

The issue has moved to the forefront of US-Iraq relations following the recent regional war, during which some attacks targeting Gulf countries were launched from Iraqi territory.

Washington has made clear that it expects Iraqi authorities to dismantle and disarm the Iran-backed armed factions, while leaving Baghdad to determine the mechanism for achieving that objective.

Key elements of any final settlement, however, remain undefined. The implementation mechanism, the guarantees sought by the armed factions, the conditions attached to any agreement, and even the groups’ final status have yet to be defined.

“Everyone agrees that all forces should ultimately come under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. There is no disagreement over that principle,” a senior commander of one of the Iran-backed armed factions told The New Region.

“The problem is not the principle itself. The problem is the conditions and the guarantees.”

“So far, there is no solution that satisfies all sides. Who can guarantee that we won’t be targeted by the Americans after we integrate and hand over our weapons?”

The government’s strategy

Rather than waiting for a comprehensive political agreement, Zaidi has quietly begun implementing his own approach on two parallel tracks, Iraqi officials involved in the process told The New Region.

The first focuses on direct engagement with armed factions that have publicly expressed a willingness to surrender their weapons and operate under state authority. As an immediate and practical first step, officials said, the government is seeking to absorb their fighters into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), where many of them already serve, while gradually dismantling the factions’ separate command and organizational structures within the force.

Saraya al-Salam, the armed wing of influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and Iraq’s largest armed faction by manpower, was the first to respond to Zaidi’s call, followed by Asaib Ahl al-Haq - one of the most powerful Iran-backed armed factions - led by Qais al-Khazali, and Kataib Imam Ali, led by Shibl al-Zaidi.

“Sadr is the strongest and most persistent advocate of disarmament,” a member of the committee responsible for receiving weapons told The New Region on condition of anonymity.

“He made his position clear and said he will hand over the personnel, equipment, and headquarters.”

“He even threatened to disown anyone who refused to comply.”

Zaidi’s second track focuses on dismantling the financial networks that have long sustained political parties and armed factions.

In late June, he launched an anti-corruption campaign targeting current and former government officials, former and current members of parliament, and politicians affiliated with political parties and armed groups.

The campaign, which has already resulted in the arrest of dozens of suspects and the seizure of more than 141 billion Iraqi dinars (about $108 million), 24 million US dollars, as well as dozens of properties, vehicles, and quantities of gold, is proving to be more than a conventional anti-corruption drive.

Government officials close to Zaidi and politicians who spoke to The New Region said the campaign is fundamentally aimed at weakening the financial foundations that have enabled some armed groups and their political allies to maintain their influence for years.

Zaidi’s financial background, according to these officials, has shaped his approach. Rather than viewing the issue primarily through a military or security lens, they said, the prime minister has sought to identify and dismantle the financial structures underpinning political and armed influence before tackling the more politically sensitive issue of disarmament.

“Anyone who connects the dots will realize that what’s really happening now isn’t merely an anti-corruption campaign, but rather a money recovery operation,” a Coordination Framework lawmaker told The New Region.

“Recovering that money is one of the most effective strategies to cut off the funding sources of armed factions and dismantle their financial networks.

“This will ultimately lead to containing and disarming them.”

The first test

Before a comprehensive implementation framework had been agreed, the government moved ahead by establishing a committee to receive weapons and fighters from factions willing to respond to its initiative.

Officials said the committee was given a narrowly defined mandate focused on overseeing the handover process rather than resolving the broader political, legal, and administrative questions that quickly emerged.

As a result, many of the requests raised by factions’ commanders, including issues related to personnel, organizational structures, and future assignments, had to be referred to the government, exposing the absence of a detailed rulebook for implementing one of Iraq’s most complex security transitions.

The first phase quickly demonstrated that the challenge extended well beyond collecting weapons. Officials told The New Region that the process evolved into a complex effort to determine the future status of thousands of fighters, dismantle long-established organizational structures, and establish common rules that could later be applied to all armed factions.

One of the committee’s first major tests involved more than 3,000 Saraya al-Salam fighters who were not registered in the PMF’s payroll database. 

Because the issue fell outside the committee’s mandate, it was referred to the government for a decision. Officials said the case exposed one of the practical difficulties the government is expected to encounter repeatedly as additional factions join the process.

Saraya al-Salam’s request to integrate those fighters into the army or police was rejected “for technical reasons.” A second request to exempt Sadr’s protection regiment from the agreement posed a different challenge.

Officials said the government was reluctant to create exceptions that could later be invoked by other faction leaders, undermining efforts to establish a single framework for all groups.

“We proposed that the regiment in question be linked to the Directorate of Facilities and Personal Protection [a unit within the Ministry of Interior], so that this exception doesn’t become a point of contention for other commanders and be exploited,” a member of the weapons inventory committee told The New Region.

“Any agreement that applies to Saraya al-Salam fighters will also apply to fighters from the other factions.”

“Khazali also requested that his security detail remain outside the equation, but they accepted the arrangement we agreed upon with Saraya al-Salam. They then requested that this arrangement include Khazali’s security detail, and the government agreed to their request.”

Despite those complications, officials said the commitment shown by the leaders of the three factions allowed the process to advance more rapidly than many had expected.

“Saraya al-Salam handed over positions, equipment, weapons, and fighters, while Asaib Ahl al-Haq have so far handed over all their fighters and about 90 percent of their weapons, including drones, tanks, and Ashtar-type ballistic missiles,” the member of the committee told the New Region.

Officials said the government’s objective extends beyond collecting weapons. The broader aim is to dismantle the organizational cohesion that has allowed the factions to continue operating as unified formations within the PMF while gradually integrating their personnel into a conventional state military structure.

“The Prime Minister wants to break them (the factions) up into individuals. We told him that we will divide them into companies, and the company commanders are the ones who will transfer them between the units.”

Reshaping the PMF

The difficulties that emerged during the first phase of implementation reinforced a broader reassessment already underway among Shiite political leaders and commanders of the armed factions over how to adapt to the new political realities - shaped by the recent US-Israel-Iran war - while preserving their political and security gains since 2003.

Officials told The New Region that the practical obstacles exposed during the initial handover process highlighted the absence of a legal and regularity framework capable of absorbing the armed factions while dismantling their separate organizational structures.

Growing domestic and international pressure heightened concerns within the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework as the PMF itself increasingly became the focus of the US pressure.

Rather than risking the institution itself, officials said, discussions gradually shifted toward developing a formula that would preserve the PMF while addressing the structural problems exposed during the first phase of implementation.

Seeking to preserve the PMF under those new realities, leaders of the Coordination Framework have put forward what officials describe as the most comprehensive institutional proposal currently under discussion.

The proposal calls for amending the existing PMF law, approved in 2016, to further institutionalize the force by aligning its command structure, military ranks, formations, specialties, salaries, and administrative regulations with those of Iraq’s regular security institutions, political leaders told The New Region.

Approving the long-delayed PMF retirement law is an essential part of the proposal. Officials said the legislation would allow retirement-eligible PMF personnel to leave the force while preserving their legal and financial entitlements, creating a significant number of vacancies that could then be used to absorb fighters from the armed factions into the PMF under a unified institutional framework.

Officials said the proposal goes beyond integrating fighters into the PMF. Once fully institutionalized, the force would provide the legal and administrative framework needed to gradually dismantle the armed factions as separate organizational structures.

“Part of the process of restoring the state’s monopoly on the use of force is not only about resolving [the issue of] the armed factions, but also about addressing the institution that accommodates them,” a Coordination Framework leader told the New Region.

Hussam al-Hassani, spokesperson for the National Wisdom Movement (Hikma), told The New Region that “the approach put forward by the Coordination Framework is intended to contribute to the institutional reorganization of the Popular Mobilization Forces. We are addressing the PMF’s institutional environment by amending the PMF Law and passing the PMF Retirement Law.” 

“Through these two laws, it will be possible to make the necessary organizational changes and personnel transfers, absorb new fighters, and implement other required measures.”