In the latest episode of The New Region's GeoSpace podcast, host Mohammed A. Salih sits down with Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics and adjunct professor at Georgetown University, to discuss how the ongoing US-Iran war is reshaping the Gulf's strategic position, exposing the limits of American security guarantees, and forcing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to rethink their economic models and alliances.

Cafiero said the Gulf’s image has “suffered significantly because of everything that has happened since late February,” adding that “it’s going to take quite a bit of time to restore that previous image of stability.”

On the vulnerability of maritime choke points, Cafiero argued that the pain from the Strait of Hormuz blockade has been deeply uneven. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar have no alternative access to the Indian Ocean and have suffered the most, while Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman have been able to partially reroute exports.

The situation is now compounding, he warned. Disruptions at Bab el-Mandeb are cutting off Saudi Arabia's Red Sea access, and a recent drone attack on the Suez Canal has raised fears of a third choke point closing.

“If there are more of those acts of sabotage, the Saudis would be really cut off, and their economy would face huge, huge problems,” he said.

On alternative pipelines and trade corridors, Cafiero believes that “they will not serve as a substitute for the Strait of Hormuz,” adding that for smaller GCC states to bypass the strait, they would need to route energy through neighboring countries, making their security dependent on intra-GCC cooperation at a moment when that cooperation is far from guaranteed.

“This ongoing crisis has posed an enormous threat to Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 and the visions of the other GCC states," Cafiero said. “Their ability to move forward with these visions has taken a hit, and progress will certainly come at a slower rate.”

Speaking about Iran's shifting targeting patterns, Cafiero argued that the initial focus on the UAE was deliberate — both to punish Abu Dhabi for its ties with Israel and to disrupt the global economy.

“Attacking the UAE so aggressively was an effective way for Iran to disrupt the global economy,” he said.

The more recent pivot toward Bahrain and Kuwait, he suggested, reflects US military presence in both countries, their geographic proximity to Iran, and a possible Iranian interest in keeping the door open to Saudi Arabia.

“Iran was trying to send a message to Saudi Arabia that it could be spared if it distances itself from the UAE, as well as the US and Israel,” he said.

“What Iran has certainly not wanted throughout this conflict is to have a united GCC against the Islamic Republic,” Cafiero said. “Taking advantage of divisions within the GCC has certainly been an Iranian strategy.”

As for the prospect of a pan-GCC defense force, Cafiero asserted that: “For the foreseeable future, the GCC countries are going to be dependent on external actors for their defense… There's no other power in the world that has the capacity and the willingness to replace the United States as a security guarantor.”

In regard to a potential Saudi normalization with Israel, Cafiero said “the idea that Saudi Arabia is going to normalize with Israel under current conditions is totally disconnected from reality.”

Looking at the broader picture, Cafiero argued that Iran has emerged from the conflict emboldened.

“Two nuclear-armed powers, Israel and the United States, have failed to overthrow the Islamic Republic,” he said. “That emboldens the leadership in Tehran very much.”

Cafiero claimed that “China is the big winner of this crisis,” stating that: “When the dust settles, the Gulf region is going to be more oriented toward China, and that is going to have a huge impact on the geopolitical and geo-economic order of the Middle East.”